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Panel Discussion: 
The Existing Legal Framework, Part I 
Professor Myron Nordquist, Stockton Professor of International Law, Naval 
War College: When Professor Grunawalt asked me to serve as a moderator for 
this Panel, he made it clear that I was to moderate and not to speak. So, I will be 
quite business-like and briefly introduce the Panel's three speakers. We have all 
agreed to strict time limits on the theory that we will have questions and comments 
from the floor and that we will all gain something from the interchange. I am 
Myron Nordquist, the current holder of the Stockton Chair here at the Naval War 
College. I am on loan from the faculty of the United States Air Force Academy. 
The first speaker on our Panel is Professor George Walker, Professor of 
International Law at Wake Forest University. George, as many of you are aware, 
is a prior holder of the Stockton Chair. Our second speaker is Professor Adam 
Roberts, Professor of International Relations at Oxford University. Adam has a 
great deal of experience in this area, and I am confident that his remarks will 
stimulate comments from the floor. 
The commentator for our Panel also has had a very distinguished career. 
Professor Paul Szasz was, until 1989, the Principal Legal Officer at the United 
Nations and is currently with the Center for International Studies at New York 
University School of Law. Among the many things that Paul has done that are not 
mentioned in his biograph in front of you is that he served as Legal Counsel to 
the International Conference on the Former-Yugoslavia. With that, may I please 
turn the rostrum over to Professor George Walker. 
Professor George K. Walker, Wake Forest University: Thank you Myron. My 
topic this morning is "The Oceans Law, the Maritime Environment and the Law 
of Naval Warfare." As do many government speakers who come to private 
institutions such as mine, I have a few disclaimers. First of all, the September 6th 
draft of my paper is just that, a draft. I welcome comments before final publication. 
Secondly, my remarks are limited to the topic of the paper; the law of the sea, the 
oceans environment and how these sometimes overlapping bodies oflaw relate to 
the law of armed conflict at sea, i.e., the law of naval warfare. Third, I might add 
that I was a member of the group of academics and sea service officers, who 
appeared in private capacity, that produced the San Remo Manual on the Law of 
Naval Warfare. I am not here to endorse the Manual; I own no stock, and will 
receive no royalties, but I wanted to make that disclaimer. Finally, I am not about 
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to cover even a small part of the substance of what I have written but that fact leads 
me to the principal points I make today. 
There is an enormous volume oflaw related to the maritime environment, most 
of it in treaties appearing since the 1958 Law of the Sea Conventions. However, if 
we include the 1907 Hague Conventions dealing with bombardment and the like, 
and their successors such as the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, the 1935 Roerich Pact, 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and so forth, there is an older and deeper legacy of 
environmental protection, at least as it pertains to general human health and 
cultural and historical objects as specific aspects of environmental quality during 
warfare. 
The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention is the first treaty to deal comprehensively 
with maritime environmental problems. For those countries that are or become 
parties, the Convention will be an effective, if "mild" trumping device, much as 
the U.N. Charter, Article 103, declares that Charter norms supersede all other 
treaties, including those treaties related to environmental protection, whether 
already in force or to come into force, which may have special terms but which 
"should be carried out in a manner consistent with the general principles and 
objectives of this Convention." That is from Article 237. In other words, what we 
have in the 1982 Covention is a constitution or a charter for the marine 
environment. The upshot of it is that all agreements in place, or to be negotiated, 
must conform generally to the Convention's generally stated norms. 
The Convention does several things with respect to the environment. First, 
Part XII deals generally with protection and preservation of the marine 
environment. Other aspects of environmental protection are found throughout 
the Convention. If, for example, you look through some of the navigational articles, 
which have already been acknowledged to represent customary law, they too have 
statements related to environmental protection, conservation, and the like. The 
third point about the Convention is that it solidly endorses the absolute sovereign 
immunity of "any warship, naval auxiliary, other vessels or aircraft owned or 
operated by a State and used, for the time being, only on government 
non-commercial service." That is language from Article 236, which is found in 
Part XII, the environmental provisions of the Convention, but similar language 
appears in other places. However, many of these provisions also declare that flag 
States bear responsibility for damage, that is, even though the warship itself is 
immune, flag States bear responsibility for any damage they may cause in 
contravention of Convention norms. Article 236 declares that States must adopt 
measures, not impairing operations or operational capabilities, to ensure that such 
vessels or aircraft operate consistently, so far as it is reasonable or practical to do 
so, with the Convention. The importance of that, especially in the non-war context, 
is that if we assume, as I do, that the 1982 Convention is more or less the 
overarching control or standard, and that all treaties in place, or to be put in place, 
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have to conform to it in substance, those treaties in place that do not have a 
sovereign immunity clause, for example, now must have soverign immunity read 
into them. I think that is fairly important for the confrontation situations that 
may confront the Navies of the world in the future. 
Another point about the Law of the Sea Conventions is that there are clauses 
in the 1958 and in the 1982 Conventions that are often overlooked. These are 
declarations that the treaties are subject to "other rules of international law," as 
well as the terms of the Conventions themselves. For example, Article 87 of the 
1982 Convention, dealing with high seas freedoms, says in part that the freedom 
of the high seas is exercised "under the conditions laid down by this Convention 
and by other rules of international law." I draw three conclusions from this. 
First, the overwhelming majority of commentators, including the International 
Law Commission, have stated that "other rules of international law" refer to the 
law of armed conflict. Therefore, provisions such as Article 88 of the 1982 
Convention state a truism, that the high seas are reserved for peaceful purposes. 
However, high seas usage can be subject to the law of naval warfare when Article 
87 is read into it. Moreover, in no case can either provision "trump" United 
Nations Charter norms, and here again we come back to Article 103 of the Charter, 
and to fundamental Charter principles which include the inherent right of 
individual and collective self-defense in Article 51. 
Second, there is no indication, at least in my research, that the drafters of the 
law of the sea conventions, certainly not in 1958, and likely not in 1982, thought 
that the "other rules" clauses referred to anything else, and particularly not to any 
customary law of the environment. To be sure, under traditional analysis, you have 
to consider parallel custom or general principles in analyzing sources that bear on 
a particular problem, but there is nothing to indicate that there was any intention 
to incorporate general customary law or general principles through the "other 
rules" clauses. 
Third, there are other agreements in being which also include clauses 
exempting, or partially exempting, their application during armed conflict; the 
older ones speaking of "war," others of "armed conflict," and still others of 
"emergency situations," and that includes the NAFT A package of about a year 
ago. This tends to confIrm the view of applying the law of armed conflict as a 
separate body oflaw in appropriate situations. To the extent that treaties dealing 
with the maritime environment do not have such clauses, and there are a few, they 
must be read in the light of the law of the sea conventions that include them; 
recalling that the 1958 High Seas Convention recites general customary norms to 
nonparties to any treaty, and that Convention has an "other rules" clause. 
Moreover, I would submit that the traditional principles of the law of treaties, 
such as impossibility of performance, fundamental change of circumstances, or 
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armed conflict, may suspend operation of some agreements for the duration of the 
conflict or other emergency situation. 
Let me turn now to problems of environmental standards during conflict. Most 
recently, the San Remo Manual, to be published later this year, endorsed Professor 
Robertson's view, set out in one of the "Newport Papers," published by the Naval 
War College, that the relationship of States not parties to a conflict and belligerents 
can be stated in terms of "due regard," this phrase being taken from the 1982 Law 
of the Sea Convention, Article 87, which states that high seas users have to exercise 
"due regard" for ocean users rights. The idea of "due regard," or words to that 
effect, was used in the 1958 and 1982 Law of the Sea Conventions to describe those 
relationships. Since the 1958 High Seas Convention reflects customary law, then 
presumably the idea of "due regard," at least in the law of the sea context, may be 
read as customary international law. 
The San Remo Manual on the Law of Naval Warfare, also applies a "due regard" 
standard for protecting the environment; belligerents must exercise "due regard" 
for the environment along with customary principles of military objective, 
proportionality, and the rest of it. In general, I agree with both positions of the 
Manual; that is, using a "due regard" formula for interfaces between the law of the 
sea and the law of naval warfare, and betwe~n the law of naval warfare and 
environmental concerns. 
I have a couple of caveats, however. First, any general "due regard" standard 
should be subject to any specific customary, treaty or general principles norm. The 
Manual recognizes these in certain contexts, such as in customary general 
principles of proportionality, and in the ENMOD prohibition on military or other 
hostile use of environmental techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe 
effects. However, since the Manual drafters chose to stop at the water's edge, there 
is little in the Manual, beyond general standards of proportionality, that would 
apply to shore bombardment or air attacks from the sea that would call into play 
treaty and customary rules regarding monuments, and so forth. 
Second, there is no indication in the Manual as to the content of either "due 
regard" standard, or whether the two are considered together as part of a general 
"due regard" standard. Do you first take "due regard," for example, for rights 
pertaining to the Exclusive Economic Zone and then consider "due regard" with 
respect to the environment within that zone? Or, do you take it the other way 
around? 
In my paper I have tried to resolve these issues as follows. First, general norms, 
perhaps stated in the U.N. Charter or treaties related to the law of naval warfare, such 
as the Hague Convention related to shore bombardment, would "trump" any general 
"due regard" principle. For example, ifwe consider that the Geneva Gas Protocol is 
an environmental norm, because it kills horses and cattle as well as people, then under 
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those circumstances that Protocol would "trump" anything else. Then, of course, 
the U.N. Charter pursuant to Article 103, would "trump" all. 
Secondly, I would argue that because some environmental principles are stated 
in treaties or custom whose parameters may overlap, but not coincide with the 
1982 Law of the Sea Convention's geographic coverage, for example those 
protecting coastal forests, and mangrove swamps do not stop at the water's edge, 
the degree of conflict between maritime environmental protection treaties and the 
1982 Convention has not yet been sorted out. Indeed, the 1982 Convention is not 
now treaty law for many countries, including the United States. 
Third, because there are environmental concerns stated in the navigational 
provisions of the 1982 Convention, for which the San Remo Manual apparently 
would state a separate "due regard" requirement, and because of the sheer volume 
of these agreements, some of them bilateral and others regional, that there should 
be one, general "due regard" requirement, throwing both law of the sea "due 
regard" concerns, such as those for the exclusive economic zone and those for 
environmental concerns, into a common analysis. In terms of anticipated military 
operations, this can be done as part of the military planning process with which 
we are familiar, even as rules of engagement can be customized for particular 
operations or scenarios. Now what I am talking about today is not so much the 
guy on the bridge of the destroyer, but the planner before the operation begins, 
when the operation order is being drafted. 
I would like to speak briefly of the specifics of the law of due regard. The 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), with which many of us are familiar, 
has a factoral approach. I suggest that planners should follow the analogy of the 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws of the United States, which follows the 
Anglo-American common law rule of applying U.S. constitutional principles, and 
then a statute before any judge-made common law principles are pronounced, 
followed by a factorial rule of reasonableness, whose analogies are in the 
Restatement (Second), Section 6 and Restatement (Third), Foreign Relations Law 
of the United States, Section 403's elaboration which might in a way be due regard 
as a synonym. 
My model would be: first, applicaton of any relevant norms in the United 
Nations Charter anologous to application of Constitutional principles; second, any 
norms stated injus cogens principles, however you want to define that term; third, 
any rules found in treaties, custom and general principles under traditional 
multisource analysis; and only then, any applicaton of "due regard" or 
reasonableness as part of the proportionality test for which a tentative list is found 
in my paper. The list is very tentative and I sincerely invite your comments on it. 
Although this formulation might seem to push "due regard" out of the picture, 
except for Charter norms, which must be observed in any case, and there may be 
a few jus cogens principles out there, there are very few traditional rules within the 
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various treaties impacting environmental concerns in the law of naval warfare. 
The result is that "due regard" or "reasonableness" factors will likely come to the 
fore more often than not through proportionality analysis. 
I will now turn to problem areas of the future. First, the proliferation of players. 
Instead of just worrying about what the Security Council and the General 
Assembly have said, we are going to be dealing with a veritable flood of new players, 
including new governments and private sector organizations. 
The second problem beginning to emerge is the notion that the right to a clean 
environment is a human rights issue. I have addressed several aspects of this 
problem in my paper. One is the so-called "derogation clause" which is found in 
some human rights conventions but not all. Another involves the application of 
the law of treaties, such as impossibility of performance, fundamental change of 
circumstances, and law of armed conflict suspension rules for treaties, and the 
attempted utilization of human rights theories to enforce environmental laws. 
The third problem area addressed in my paper involves the carryover of land 
warfare concepts, particularly those in Additional Protocol I, into an analysis of 
environmental protection in naval warfare. I think there is a possibility of that 
trend continuing. 
The last point I would like to make concerns the utility of a new humanitarian 
law treaty for protection of the environment. In my paper I argue that now is not 
the time to do that and I reach that conclusion for some of the reasons that have 
already been stated by prior speakers at this symposium. 
One final comment. Jack provided us with the text of Paragraph 8.1.3, 
"Environmental Considerations," from the newly revised Commander's Handbook 
on the Law o/Naval Operations. In general, I would agree with that treatment. The 
one dissent I would have is my reference to what I call the black letter law. That 
is, before you get into the due regard analysis set out in Paragraph 8.1.3, I think I 
would follow the model of Restatement Second, Conflict of Laws, Section 6, that 
if you have any black letter norms that apply directly to an issue, such as the 1925 
Geneva Gas Protocol, you never get into the due regard analysis. 
The foregoing summarizes my lengthy paper and extensive footnotes. My 
remarks, and indeed those of others at this Symposium, demonstrate that the 
environmental protection factor is a real issue for planners today and will continue 
to be so for the foreseeable future. While there are few clear navigational beacons 
to show the way in terms of applicable law during armed conflict at sea, there is a 
real opportunity to develop norms that will, at the same time, assure maximum 
permissible use of the Earth's oceans, while protecting the maritime environment, 
and assure each country's security through lawful use of force on the seas. Thank 
you. 
294 Protection of the Environment During Armed Conflict 
Professor Nordquist: Thank you George. Our next speaker is Professor Adam 
Roberts. 
Professor Adam Roberts, Oxford University: Rather than summarize my paper, 
which deals with numerous aspects of environmental damage in war-with 
particular reference to the 1990-1991 Gulf Conflict-I will take up a few specific 
issues related to the subject of the paper that have come up here in discussions. 
Rear Admiral Wright clearly felt that there was some risk that environmental 
considerations would undermine deterrence postures. On this critically important 
issue, two key points should be stressed. 
First, although it is sometimes discussed as if it was a new issue, protection of 
the environment is a classic "law of war" issue. Environmental damage resulting 
from war can affect innocent civilians. It can affect third countries; and, it concerns 
damage that may endure long after a conflict. All these characteristics mean that 
environmental damage is completely within the area of classic laws of war 
restraints. 
Second, environmental damage in war is often caused by an aggressor who 
wants to hang on to his ill-gotten gains or to destory them rather than return them. 
Hence the scorched earth policy pursued by the Nazis in many areas towards the 
end of World War II, especially in northern Norway; and the Iraqi destruction of 
the oil wells in Kuwait at the very end of the land campaign in 1991. Limiting and 
controlling such environmental destruction, by developing legal restraints on it, 
may indeed serve the cause of weakening the position of aggressors. 
Environmental concerns may thus be compatible with at least some deterrent 
purposes. 
I do not want to imply that it is only aggressors that engage in environmental 
destruction. Yesterday someone said that he could think of no precedent for what 
happened in the Gulfin 1991. There is a precedent, mentioned briefly in my paper, 
which involved a British Colonel who in Romania in the winter of 1916-17, ran 
riot with a box of matches. He drove a car around destroying any oil wells he could 
find, as well as corn fields. He was at the same time, a British member of 
Parliament. The reason he did it was that Romania was about to be occupied by 
the Central Powers. For his services, he was awarded the Commander of the Grand 
Star of Romania Medal. 
Irrespective of the critical importance of environmental issues in war, I agree 
strongly with Chris Greenwood that neither the act of destruction of oil facilities, 
nor every act involving environmental damage, necessarily constitutes a violation 
of the laws of war. The existing law leaves space for a degree of latitude in the 
pursuit of legitimate military purposes. While new rules in the two 1977 
agreements (Additional Protocol I and ENMOD) may have some value in respect 
of certain particular cases of environmental destruction, or possibly certain 
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particular cases of use of the environment as a weapon, for the most part the issue of 
environmental destruction is addressed in long-standing and much simpler rules, 
partuclarly 1907 Hague Convention IV and the 1949 Geneva Conventions. These 
include, particu1arly, a rule mentioned yesterday by many people: Article 147 of the 1949 
Geneva Convention IV declares that extensive destruction of property not justified by 
military necessity is a grave breach. The word "environment" does not appear in the 
other rules, but that is not necessary for them to have relevance to the environment. 
Many individuals and institutions have understated the value of these older 
provision. At the time of the 1991 Gulf War, for example, in dealing with the matter 
of environmental destruction many people, including the International Committee 
of the Red Cross, got the balance wrong by putting slightly too much emphasis on 
1977 Additional Protocol I, which, of course, was not technically in force. 
Since the 1991 Gulf Conflict, the ICRC has had three meetings of experts to discuss 
the protection of the environment in time of armed conflict. This work has led to a 
number of resolutions by the U.N. General Assembly, to which I refer in my paper. 
The approach taken by the ICRC has been a very good one, stressing the illegality of 
many qCts of environmental destruction under long-established rules of international 
law, as well as the importance of ratification of more recent conventions. 
I now want to look at the actual events of the 1991 Gulf War, highlighting the 
issue of the failure of deterrence. There was a tendency among many before the 
war to exaggerate the nature of the environmental threat. Such exaggerations 
reflected the perennial fascination of man with apocalyptic threats such as 
environmental catastrophe. However, it is not necessary to warn of a global 
environmental catastrophe in order to justify opposition to acts of environmental 
destruction and despoliation. Crying of "wolf' did considerable damage. It meant 
that, in many minds, concern with the environment was associated with 
opposition to the war and tQ the attempt to reverse the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. 
Some of the deterrent threats made before the war by the Coalition powers 
were concerned with dissuading Iraq from engaging in acts of environmental 
destruction. The clearest example was the famous Bush letter that was not 
accepted in Geneva on 9 January 1991. There was a Security Council Resolution 
on 29 October 1990 threatening legal action in respect to Iraqi violations of 
Geneva Convention IV. 
The Bush letter warned Iraq not to commit acts of destruction of the oil wells, 
yet Iraq was not deterred. Why not? Iraq was successfully deterred from engaging 
in other unlawful actions, in particular use of chemical weapons. One might say 
that part of the explanation is that the Coalition powers in the end put much less 
emphasis on preventing environmental destruction than they put on other forms 
of deterrence, including against the use of nuclear, bacteriological and chemical 
weapons. 
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I may be wrong, but I am told that not a single one of the many millions of 
leaflets that were dropped on Iraqi positions during the war tried to prevent acts 
of environmental despoliation, such as the destruction of the oil wells. One can 
point to other failures to press this issue hard enough. Perhaps this was because it 
did not involve the saving oflives of Coalition troops. 
For the Coalition leaders, the prime issue was deterring Iraq from using 
chemical weapons. They probably felt that they could not make equal threats in 
respect to acts of environmental destruction. They could only use the ultimate 
threat in respect of one class of action. The result was that environmental 
destruction fell through the cracks of deterrence. 
Now I will discuss a few post-war implementation questions. After the 1991 
Gulf War there were no trials of the, major figures responsible. The international 
community instead chose to follow the path of reparations which, in many 
respects, is unsatisfactory: it does not effectively punish those directly responsible 
for the acts of environmental despoliation. 
The United States reported a whole range ofIraqi war crimes, including acts of 
environmental despoliation, to the United Nations in March 1993 in a little noted 
document which I happened to pick up quite by chance in the U.N. Building. 
However, we have not seen a satisfactory implementation of international 
standards. This underlines the more general point that implementation of the law 
of war is proving to be an extraordinarily difficult issue in the contemporary world. 
In conclusion, I would just make two general observations about 
implementation of the laws of war in the contemporary world, both of which I 
think are controversial, especially to lawyers. 
The first is that it is the case that there is much more of a link between the laws 
of war, jus in bello, and the law about resort to war,jus ad bellum, then is generally 
admitted. Often one State's illegal behavior in war leads to a decision by other 
powers to engage in hostilities as the only way of effectively stopping the offending 
State's behavior. 
Second, the 1991 Gulf War illustrates the possiblity, not extensively discussed 
in the literature, that the laws of war can be seen as a set of professional military 
standards to be applied, even if necessary unilaterally, by one side in a war. This 
is especially the case in coalition actions. We had reinforcement of that approach 
in the discussion yesterday of Operation Sharp Guard in the Adriatic. In coalition 
actions, there may be a special value in observing the laws of war because it is a 
means of maintaining support for the coalition, both within the countries involved 
and between them. 
Professor Nordquist: Thank you Adam. I will now turn the rostrum over to our 
commentator, Professor Paul Szasz-Paul? 
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Professor Paul C. Szasz, New York University: Thank you very much Myron. 
The principal speakers have given excellent presentations of the subject of our 
panel: "The existing Legal Framework on Protecting The Environment During 
International Armed Conflict." I agree with their principal conclusions, on which 
I will elaborate a bit later. However, I do have one or two litde nits to pick with 
both of them. 
Professor Walker referred once or twice to the "trumping effect" of the U.N. 
Charter provisions over other potential environmental principles, referring to 
Article 103 of the Charter, which states that that treaty supersedes all other treaties, 
earlier or subsequent. 
He refers, in particular, to Article 51 of the Charter and the self-defense 
provisions therein. But when one looks at Article 51, it does not create the right 
of self-defense. Article 51 states that nothing in the Charter shall derogate from 
the existing underlying right of self-defense. But it clearly does not create a right 
to self-defense. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Charter says that self-defense 
justifies anything that could not be justified otherwise. Moreover, even if that were 
so, I do not believe that the Charter authorizes the use of force so as to violate 
humanitarian considerations, anymore than Article 42 authorizes the Security 
Council to override humanitarian treaties. I do not think that the Security Council 
could order the destruction of civilians as an Article 42 action. So I consider this 
"trumping effect" as not really relevant or significant. 
The other point I would challenge is that any distinction between the rules of 
naval warfare and the rules ofland warfare could make a difference regarding the 
protection of the environment. I think that the justification for any distinctions 
has largely disappeared. When a U.S. naval vessel can send missiles 250 miles 
inland to hit targets near Banja Luka, one cannot say that different rules should 
apply to what may be done to a particular target, if the missiles had been fired by 
an airplane, or from ground artillery from 10 or 20 miles away over the Croatian 
border. 
The rules for protecting the environment must depend on the location of the 
environmental damage. If the potential target is an oil tanker, it should be just as 
illegal to hit it from a shore battery as it is to hit it from a naval battery or an 
airplane. Therefore, I think that these distinctions, to the extent that they 
exist-and I will not argue about this because it is not a field in which I am 
expert-will have to be eliminated. The applicable rule should always depend on 
the target, and not on whether the attack comes from a naval, air or land force. 
Coming now to Professor Roberts' presentation, I also have some quibbles. One 
is the example he gave about the British officer in Romania torching oil wells; Two 
things should be said. First of all, the circumstances were that Romania was about 
to be taken over by the enemy and the Romanians later rewarding him for that 
action. This is an example of self-scorching of territory, the scorched earth policy, 
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mentioned yesterday, used by the Russians to scorch their own earth as they were 
retreating. This is not the same as scorching someone else's territory. Moreover, 
burning the wells was not recognized as an environmental threat then and, indeed, 
it was not. At that time, the C02 overload of the atmosphere was not nearly as 
dangerous as it is now. 
Moreover, of course, the British officer, Colonel Griffiths, did not consider 
environmental matters. The Iraqis did. They made the threat that what they were 
about to do might cause a global winter. They knew they were doing something 
destructive to the envrionment. In fact, they thought their actions would be far 
more destructive to the environment than they actually were. So I think the 
Romanian example is not really appropriate here. 
As to mere reliance on the Hague Rules, I think we can show some examples 
where they are insufficient to protect the environment. For instance, releasing a 
great deal of ozone destroying chemicals into the atmosphere will not be destroying 
anyone's property because it cannot be said that the ozone layer is somebody's 
property. Furthermore, the value of the property destroyed may be quite 
disproportionately slight compared to the environmental damage caused. Thus, 
if the environmental damage caused is far greater than the value of the property 
destroyed, there might not be much of a case under the Hague Convention, making 
it necessary to find some other basis for protecting the environment. 
Now I would like to briefly summarize my understanding of the state of the 
existing law to protect the environment during warfare. First of all, there are rules 
governing armed conflict, the so called humanitarian rules. Some generally 
prohibit wanton destruction. These go back to 1899, 1907 and perhaps even earlier. 
They are embodied in treaties that have almost universal participation and, in any 
event, are generally considered to have become solid parts of customary 
international law binding even nonparties to these treaties. The Hague 
Conventions do not specifically refer to the environment, but they do, incidentally, 
protect the environment if they are observed. 
On the other hand, there are other humanitarian law instruments that are more 
recent. These include the ENMOn Convention and Additional Protocol I to the 
Geneva Conventions. Each contain specific environmental provisions, but have 
not received all that many ratifications. Because of the paucity of ratifications, they 
cannot be said to have become part of customary law. Consequently, they do not 
bind any countries, except those parties to the treaty. As we know, in the 1991 Gulf 
War, Iraq was not a party to many of the relevant treaties, while the United States 
was not a party to Additional Protocol I. Therefore, it was difficult to rely on the 
environmental principles set forth in those treaties. 
Secondly, there are the treaties and norms relating generally to environmental 
protection, such as those expressed in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and the 
oil dumping and oil pollution conventions that originate with the IMO, as well as 
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the UNEP-sponsored 1978 Kuwait Oil Pollution Protocol to the Regional 
Maritime Environment Convention that covers the Persian Gulf. As to these, the 
problem is that they do not indicate whether or not, and to what extent, they are 
meant to apply during an international armed conflict. 
Finally, there are among the environmental instruments, some that specifically 
address the environment in time of war, such as the 1982 World Charter of Nature 
and the 1992 UNCED Declaration. Unfortunately, these are simply declarations 
of high-level international plenary bodies, and thus really constitute only the 
softest of soft law. At most, they may indicate what the future law might be. As to 
solid law, we must simply go back to the Hague Coventions. 
Following the Gulf War, with its major and deliberate environmental 
destruction, there was a flurry of legal stock-taking to see what had gone wrong 
and to determine whether the existing law was good enough. Greenpeace and 
others proposed the formulation of a fifth Geneva Convention. Others suggested 
the establishment of an International Green Cross to protect the environment. 
Fairly quickly, these initiatives were taken up by the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) which, of course, was concerned to protect its own unique 
status as the champion of humanitarian law-as expanded through Additional 
Protocol I to include some general environmental concerns. It was also taken up 
by the U.N. General Assembly, which rather cautiously decided to give the ICRC 
the lead to see what it could produce. 
Within two years, the Red Cross produced a comprehensive report on the 
subject (set out in U.N. Document N48/269 of29 July 1993), which the General 
Assembly then substantially endorsed. I would commend that document to 
anyone interested in the subject matter of this panel, as it is very complete. The 
report also summarizes the frantic legal activity starting with the spring of 1991. 
It concludes that the time was not opportune for codifying and/or developing this 
area of the law, but that a number of remedial and other measures should be taken 
to patch up and reinforce the existing archaic regime. Many of the proposals it 
discusses were first articulated at the now notorious 1991 Ottawa Conference. 
Actually, if one compares the Red Cross meetings with other related 
conferences, one finds many similarities. This is because the experts convened by 
the ICRC are likely to be the same persons who participated in previous and 
subsequent conferences on the same subject. 
Having been initally amongst those who advocated a reformulation and 
expansion of the existing laws through a new treaty, I would now like to confess 
and concede the force of the arguments against such a project. My principal reason 
for this retreat is that stated yesterday by the Legal Adviser to the State 
Department, Mr. Harper. At present, governments would simply not be ready to 
assume any serious new obligations in this field. Any attempt to formulate a new 
treaty at this time would likely be regressive and, thus, counter-productive. 
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As the Legal Advisor to the 1979-1980 U.N. Conference on Inhumane 
Conventional Weapons, I saw the extent to which the military advisers jealously 
opposed the imposition of any restrictions that could inhibit military actions their 
forces might conceivably engage in, even though such restrictions would, if 
observed, greatly protect the troops whose commanders they were representing. I 
am afraid the same thing would happen if, at this stage, in this atmosphere, an 
attempt were made to convene a conference to improve the law protecting the 
environment during warfare. 
This having been said, I would like to summarize a number of proposals, some 
of which are set out in the 1990-93 ICRC report, for improving the current state 
of the law. I will first direct my suggestions to the state of actual combat, on which 
we seem to be concentrating most, but will also cover, as was suggested in our 
second panel yesterday, the pre- and post-combat phases. With respect to the 
combat phase I would suggest that the following be done. 
First, there should be a campaign to promote adherence to the existing treaties, 
particularly to Additional Protocol I and to ENMOD, so that they cover 
substantially all countries in the world. 
Second, an attempt should be made to clarify the existing norms, particularly 
the terms "widespread," "long-lasting" and "severe," which appear disjunctively 
in the ENMOD Convention and conjunctively in Additional Protocol I. It is 
understood that these terms were meant to be different in the two conventions, as 
shown by the respective travaux. 
The ICRC suggests that the committee of experts that may be established under 
the ENMOD Convention, straighten out these differences. I have some doubts 
about that suggestion because it would likely be one-sided. 
Most important is to clarify the status of environmental treaties during armed 
conflicts. These include general environmental treaties, as well as the 
environmental provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention, the oil dumping rules, 
and regional seas conventions. First of all, during a status of war, what is the state 
of these conventions as between parties to the conflict, assuming that both are 
parties to the treaty in question? And secondly, what is the status between such 
parties and neutrals? In that connection, one must consider that during wartime 
certain treaties are suspended as between the parties to the conflict, and also, that 
certain rules may simply be inapplicable to a conflict situation. 
On the other hand, one should also consider that some of the obligations 
established by environmental treaties, in fact, all those deriving from multilateral 
treaties, are ergo omnes obligations. Just as two parties bound by such an ergo omnes 
obligation could not, by agreement between themselves, suspend that obligation, 
why should they be able to do so just by going to war with each other? 
Turning now to the ICRC proposal for the wide publication of the 
environmental rules relating to warfare and, in particular, the formulation and 
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distribution of manuals on environmental protection during combat. Indeed, the 
1993 ICRC report has annexed a 3~page set of guidelines showing how such a 
manual should be formulated. That enterprise should be undertaken quite 
seriously. It is one of the most important measures, because, as was pointed out 
yesterday, all rules are meaningless unless they are known and understood at the 
level of the commanders who will implement them. 
There is a need to establish a supervisory organ to assist the parties in 
implementing these provisions during wartime. One candidate, not necessarily 
the best nor the only existing one, is the International Fact~Finding Commission 
established pursuant to Article 90 of Additional Protocol I. 
Turning now to the pre~combat phase, there are, flrst of all, the rules restricting 
the right to engage in military conflicts and those designed to inhibit preparation 
for war. In this connection I would like to call attention to a little known General 
Assembly Resolution on the "Historical Responsibility of States for the 
Preservation of Nature for Present and Future Generations." Therein the 
Assembly noted that the continuation of the arms race, including the testing of 
various types of weapons, especially nuclear weapons, and the accumulation of 
toxic chemicals, adversely affect the human environment and damage the 
vegetable and animal world; it therefore proclaimed the historical responsibility 
of States for the preservation of nature for present and future generations and drew 
the attention of States to the fact that the continuing arms race has a pernicious 
effect on the environment, and reduces the prospects for the necessary 
international cooperation in preserving nature on our planet. 
I do not really think that this quite sensible statement is of much use. 
Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that simply preparing for war is itself apt 
to be environmentally destructive. 
A more pertinent and practical rule, regarding the development of new 
weapons, is Article 36 of Additional Protocol I. It is rarely mentioned, but I 
consider it important. Article 36 reads as follows: "In the study, development, 
acquisition or adoption of new weapons, means or methods of warfare, a High 
Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine whether its employment 
would, in some or in all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any 
other rule ofinternationallaw applicable to the High Contracting Party." In other 
words, one should not develop weapons whose use is prohibited for humanitarian 
reasons. Though this caution was not addressed to environment consideration, 
but, is formulated within the context of general humanitarian rules, it can equally 
apply to environmental restrictions. 
In this connection, I would like to call attention to environmental impact 
assessments and to the precautionary principle. Neither of these makes any sense 
in a combat situation. But in a non~combat situation, when new weapons are being 
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prepared, it makes eminent sense to make such assessments and even to apply the 
precautionary principle. 
Finally, as to the development of targeting rules, to the extent that these are 
made at the policy level in the Pentagon, there is an opportunity to consider 
environmental principles that a company commander or battleship captain would 
not necessarily be able to take into account. For instance, the point made yesterday 
regarding how to stop an oil tanker. Do you shoot at it, or do you not shoot at it. 
That decision should really be made back home and should be conveyed to the 
captain of the blockading vessel. 
As to the post combat situation, I make the following suggestions. First, it might 
be useful to establish an international fact finding body to determine after every 
such conflict what happened from the environmental point of view. We are four 
or five years past the Gulf War and there are still questions about who did what to 
whom. If there had existed some sort of international fact finding organization it 
might have been used for this and other conflicts. 
Second, is the liability of States, which might even relate to damage that was 
lawfully inflicted. Thus, even if it is concluded that in a war situation a particular 
oil pollution convention does not apply, if a State in the course of armed conflict 
pollutes an area, there is no reason why that State should not pay for the clean-up 
or for whatever other damage resulted. Why should a State be allowed to cause 
damage and then not compensate neutrals or innocent parties? 
Third, criminal liability. I think we now have a much better basis for this than 
we had at the time of the Gulf War. Since then, two war crimes tribunals have been 
established and the General Assembly is well on its way to establishing an 
international criminal court. In this regard, I might call attention to a Mock 
International Criminal Tribunal conducted by the American Bar Association in 
1991, to try Saddam Hussein on a variety of charges, including for environmental 
war crimes. It was an interesting exercise. 
Fourth, is the question of the remnants of war. I would like to call attention to 
a General Assembly Resolution, again not well known, in which the Assembly 
states that it was: "Convinced that the responsibility for the removal of the 
remnants of war should be borne by the countries that planted them, recognizing 
that the presence of the material remnants of war, particularly mines, on the lands 
of developing countries seriously impedes development efforts and causes loss of 
life and property." Further, it regrets that no real measures had been taken to solve 
the problem of remnants of war, despite the various resolutions and decisions 
adopted by itself and by the Governing Council ofUNEP. Finally, the Assembly 
reiterated support for the just demands of the States affected by the implantation 
of mines and the presence of remnants of war on their lands, and called for 
compensation to be paid by the States responsible for leaving those remants. This 
is an important subject and ought to be pursued further. You may know that a few 
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months ago, in June 1995, a meeting on the removal of mines was sponsored by 
the United Nations to address this problem. 
These are the proposals that I would make for protecting the environment from 
the effects of international armed conflict. Thank you Mr. Chairman. 
Professor Nordquist: Thank you. Our Commentator has, I am sure, provoked a 
couple of specific responses from our speakers. What I would like to do, as he has 
raised so many fundamental points, is to ask, first, that the audience be given an 
opportunity for questions and comments. . 
Vice Admiral James H. Doyle, Jr., U.S. Navy (Ret.): Professor Szasz may have 
retreated, but it is probably only a millimeter. You have raised a number ofissues with 
which I take issue. We do not have all day, however, so I will focus on just one or two. 
I think to pursue the clarification of trying to find the true meaning of "severe," 
"widespread," and "long-term" is a futile exercise and will get us nowhere. 
Actually, I think the standard that we have in both the San Remo Manual, which 
relates to military necessity, and the one that Professor Grunawalt passed out the 
other day, is a much more realistic standard. I would submit that it will give much 
more protection to the environment in specific situations than any effort to try to 
find the true meaning of "widespread," "long-term," and "severe." 
I would, as a matter of fact, like to see Additional Protocol I eliminate that 
standard because I think it is meaningless. I think also that I must defend the 
military against the allegation that we are bound and determined to prevent any 
modification or improvement in the laws of war. I think from the speakers that 
we have heard, you will find there is a great deal of difference between assessing 
the context and situation and the taking of action as a policy matter, rather than 
an abstract legal principle. I believe that it has been shown that there is a much 
greater appreciation of the environment, and the necessity to protect the 
environment to the maximum extent, during armed conflict. 
Professor Szasz: I will respond very briefly. On the point of pursuing better 
definitions of "widespread," "long-term," and "severe," this is really not my 
suggestion. It is one that the ICRC repeated several times, even in its latest report. 
The General Assembly also endorsed the idea that such clarification should be 
pursued. I, myself, share some of Admiral Doyle's doubts on that point. 
I can say that at the 1979-1980 Conference I really saw the military advisers 
absurdly defensive of some weapons that were clearly inhumane and that the 
military currently clearly did not want to use, merely because it was conceivable 
that in the future some situations might arise in which such weapons might be of 
some use. I do not want to make a general accusation of all militaries at all times, 
304 Protection of the Environment During Armed Conflict 
but it is my feeling, as I believe it also was of Mr. Harper, that if you now tried to 
get a more extensive treaty, the results would probably be counter-productive. 
Professor Michael Bothe, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt, 
Germany: I have two comments. First, the sea-land dichotomy. I completely agree 
with Professor Szasz that what counts is the target. As far as targets on land are 
concerned, the "due regard" rule of the law of the sea is not applicable. The "due 
regard" rule of the law of the sea is really a development of the classical law of the 
sea in circumstances where you had competing users making war and peace over 
navigation rights, as a kind of competing use, which have to be some how 
accommodated. That is the basic justification of the "due regard" rule. 
This is not applicable to any damage caused on land. As far as damage on land 
is concerned, which may be caused by shooting or by releasing oil from a tanker, 
it is a good old rule that neutral territory is inviolate. This means a protection of 
the neutral against the effects of war. The fact that two countries make war between 
each other does not give them any right to cause damage to neutral territory. The 
relationship between the parties to a conflict and neutral States is governed by the 
laws of peace. There are exceptions, mainly in the field of naval warfare. However, 
there is no rule of customary internationaIlaw permitting States to cause collateral 
damage to neutral territory. 
My second point is the question of "new law." I think what all the speakers have 
very convincingly shown is that this is a good subject for discussion. Why is this 
a good subject for discussion? Because there are uncertainties to say the least. It 
would be quite an appropriate purpose of new law to resolve those uncertainties. 
The main argument I have heard against the development of the law yesterday, 
and this morning, is that, for the time being, it is not advisable to try to get new 
laws because that would be regressive and because States do not want to undertake 
additional obligations and so on. Granted that may be so, but the fact that States 
are reluctant to accept something does not necessarily mean that it is not necessary 
to try. 
We can then surrender to the objective necessities of universal diplomacy and 
the like, but there is no reason to be really content with this situation. That being 
so, I am, of course, very much tempted by Professor Szasz's approach which asked; 
"if we cannot achieve a treaty which might be desirable, what can we do in the 
meantime?" I agree that there are a number of steps which can be taken for the 
purpose of clarifying the law by whatever means. I think the military manuals are 
a good place to start in addition to consultation between countries concerning 
rules of engagement, in certain situations. There is also the approach of utilizing 
conferences of these parties to environmental treaties. In reviewing those treaties, 
pay more attention to the question of what happens within the scope of the treaty 
in the event that an armed conflict breaks out. Thank you. 
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Professor Nordquist: Thank you. May I ask Professor Walker ifhe would respond 
perhaps to the first point you made, then Professor Roberts, maybe you can 
comment on his second point. 
Professor Walker: In discussing "due regard," I come back to my first disclaimer. 
What I was talking about primarily was the law of the sea, the law of naval warfare, 
and the environment. 
Professor Roberts: On Professor Bothe's second point, about the desirability, or 
otherwise, of a new convention, I think it is mischievous of him, to imply that those 
who are skeptical about the value of a new convention are skeptical exclusively, or 
even largely, on the grounds that States do not want it, or are reluctant to embark 
on a new negotiation. There is another ground, which is that nobody could quite 
see the desirable shape of such a new convention or how to make a serious advance 
on the existing treaty provisions. 
Professor Ivan Shearer, University of Sidney: I just want to make two or three 
very brief comments. The first on Professor Walker's paper, which I have not yet 
read, but the summary was very interesting. I want to comment on the apparent 
disagreement between Professor Walker and Professor Szasz over the nature of 
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter as a kind ofa "trump." Maybe the true explanation 
is that the law of armed conflict, including the right of self-defense, is lex specialis, 
viewed against the lex generalis of environmental and other laws that apply in 
peacetime. 
So one of the things we are looking at here, I think, is to what extent 
environmental protections are incorporated in the lex specialis of the law of armed 
conflict through the principles of military necessity and proportionality. 
The second comment that I want to make concerns Professor Roberts' reference 
to Geneva Convention IV ofl949, Article 147. Several people have mentioned this. 
I am sure he did not mean to do so, but it came out as a general rubric against 
environmental destruction. Of course, it has to be remembered that that provision 
relates only to the duties of an occupying power vis-a-vis civilians. Now, that, of 
course, was the situation in Kuwait. It leads to an interesting question of whether 
there is a shift from the duties that Iraq owed Kuwait under Article 147. Is there 
a shift once the occupying power begins defending that territory against the 
attempts by the lawful owners to reoccupy it? Does one then move into a different 
world where Article 147 does not apply, but some other rules do? I just throw that 
open for discussion and would be interested to see if anybody has an explanation 
for that. The background of Article 147 is to be found in the Hague Conventions, 
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which refer to the occupiers as usufructuary. So, I think there is an unresolved 
conflict there. 
Finally, I wonder whether Professor Roberts really thought it was a mistake for 
the allies not to have specifically warned Iraq against environmental damage. What 
else should we have warned him not to do? We were dealing with someone who 
was not entirely rational. At least we thought he was not entirely rational. To give 
him a whole list of things that,he should not do might only put ideas into his head. 
Thank you. 
Professor Nordquist: Thank you very much. We have to give our panel an 
opportunity to respond to what has been said to this point. 
Professor Roberts: Both those points are well taken. On the first, within the limits 
of time available, I was using Article 147 of the Geneva Convention as an example 
of the fact that there are long-established provisions which cover many, but! would 
agree with those who have said not necessarily all, cases of environmental 
destruction. You may be right that at a time when the occupation of Kuwait was 
ending and a struggle for reconquest of Kuwait was beginning, you could argue 
whether the applicable law was that relating to occupied territory, or that relating 
to armed conflict. There are provisions, including those in the Hague Convention 
of 1907, which would govern the situation of armed conflict. So one does not rely 
on one provision alone. 
As regards the proposition about putting ideas in Saddam Hussein's head, I 
think, unfortunately, there were quite a lot of ideas there already. The Coalition 
did specifically warn Iraq about environmental destruction, or at least about 
destruction of the oil wells, in George Bush's letter of9 January 1991. So there was 
a very clear warning. It is a question of judgement whether that letter could or 
should have been followed up. A number of other matters were successfully 
pursued in the leaflet campaigns including the issue of non-use of gas and the very 
successful campaign persuading Iraqi soldiers that if they left their vehicles they 
would be a great deal safer than if they stayed in them. To me, it is still something 
of an oddity that there was no effort made to persuade officers within Kuwait, who 
were going to be ordered to carry out the task, that the destruction of the oil wells 
would be a war crime. That simply was not spelled out with clarity to the people 
who counted. 
I agree that the threat of destruction of the oil wells probably could not have 
been made a central issue to the same extent as the threat of use of gas. But 
nonetheless, it would not have been putting ideas into Suddam Hussein's head. 
As Bill Arkin reminded us yesterday, he had explicitly planned this oil destruction 
from August 1990 and had publicly threatened the Coalition with it in September 
1990. 
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Professor Szasz: I would like to comment on the issue of Article 51. I do not doubt 
it is lex specialis, but all I was saying is that Article 51 does not create a right of 
self-defense. Therefore, U.N. Charter Article 103 does not give self-defense a 
higher status than other activities of States. Self-defense, and all that goes with it, 
has to stand on its own legal feet. It can not rely on the Charter to exempt it from 
rules governing other military actions. 
Dr. Hans-Peter Gasser, International Committee of the Red Cross: I would 
like to say a few words about where the ICRC stands now and what we have on the 
program. I have a copy of the 1993 report mentioned by Professor Szasz. If the 
organizer would be so kind to Xerox it, it could be at the disposal of everybody. 
In 1993, many points were brought out which have already been mentioned. 
First, the relation between the ENMOD Convention and Additional Protocol I. 
We are not really pursuing that matter and we leave it to others. No action is 
planned in this respect. 
Second, the applicability of armed conflict to international environmental law. 
There is no question that general environmental law continues to be binding in 
armed conflict. There is indeed a necessity to clarify the law of the subject. 
Third, the protection of the environment and restrictions on the use of mines. 
The mines issue, which generally has not been directly associated with the 
environmental question, of course, is actually very much associated with it. As you 
know, next week the Review Conference of the 1980 Conventional Weapons 
Convention meets in Vienna. The ICRC is on record for having called for a 
complete ban on anti-personnel land mines for humanitarian reasons. But also, 
the environment is being used as a kind of vehicle which must also be protected 
in order to protect human beings which move around in the environment. 
Therefore, there is the proposal to put a complete ban on anti-personnel land 
mines. Most governments do not follow that line of thinking. However, we remain 
absolutely convinced that with time, the military will understand that such 
anti-personnel land mines Ehould be outlawed. It is estimated that there are about 
a hundred million land mines now scattered all around the world. Therefore, 
action on this issue is expected. 
The issue of the protection of natural reserves and parks has been handed over 
to UNESCO. The protection of the environment in time of non-international 
armed conflict is an important topic. We attempt to deal with that issue through 
the distribution and use of manuals. Manuals should be used in all types of 
international armed conflict without making any difference between the two 
categories. Distribution of manuals is high on our priority list. With regard to the 
rules for the protection of the environment, this will be a discussion topic 
tomorrow where I will present some proposals. 
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Utilizing the Article 90 Fact Finding Commission, as a means to monitoring 
compliance, is to be commended. Finally, dissemination being the beginning and 
the end with respect to furthering respect for humanitarian law. 
I have just one comment regarding Professor Roberts' statement that any 
violation of the rules regarding the environment is also a violation of some other 
rule. He seems to place more emphasis on the other rule and not so much on the 
violation of the environmental rule. Specifically, he felt that ICRC and others have 
put too much emphasis on the environmental side in the case of the Gulf War. 
Well, I wonder whether placing so much emphasis on the property approach is so 
satisfactory. If! look at the Gulf Report of the United States Armed Forces, under 
the heading of Environmental Terrorism, the text seems to indicate that the 
environment is not important, it is just a question of property. I do not think this 
is really a good statement of where we stand. There are so many problems with 
regard to the environment. I think it is important to put forward, and refer to, 
environmental rules and Additional Protocol I, even though some other 
provisions may be affected. Thank you. 
Professor Nordquist: Thank you. I am going to ask the panelists to keep their 
rounds chambered and ask Professor Green, Dr. McNeill and then, Professor 
Shearer, to respond and then close the list unless anyone is really moved. Professor 
Green. 
Professor Leslie C. Green, University of Alberta: All I will say about Ottawa at 
this stage is that I have the feeling from a number of the comments that have been 
made that there is a complete misunderstanding of the purpose of the Chairman's 
concluding statement at that Conference. I wish they would go back and look again 
and see why the Chairman made the statement he did. 
With regard to Article 51 of the Charter, generally, I think we ought to 
remember that the purpose of the Charter was to preserve the peace. As such, I 
think Professor Shearer gets close to it when he points out in his lex generalis, "We 
must be very careful not to quote the Charter, not to keep going back to the Charter 
once we are in a stage of armed conflict." The law of armed conflict is very much 
lex specialis. There is nothing in lex generalis that forbids a resort to lex specialis, 
particularly when the lex generalis in question is related to an entirely different type 
ofissue, the preservation of peace, the prevention of conflict. Therefore, the debate 
on Article 51, whether it creates a right or recognizes a right, I submit, becomes 
completely irrelevant. 
In regard to the problem of new law. It is very nice to talk about new law. It is 
a lovely ideology. It gives a very good feeling to the lawyers who may be involved 
in the discussion. But in too many cases, particularly in recent years with this new 
political correctness that we have on an international level, where we all have to 
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bow down to the views of the developing countries come what may, I have the 
feeling that too often when we are talking about "new law" we find that the 
developing countries, bless them, do not like the "old law." In too many cases, we 
are likely to go backwards rather than to go forward. That was very clear over the 
issues in the Law of the Sea Conference with regard to no longer recognizing the 
territorial sea as it had been understood for centuries. 
Again, the other thing that arises with regard to the new law is very much like 
what happens whenever the U.N. is discussing a humanitarian prospect. We all 
love humanity, so long as we do not have to do anything about it. Therefore, we 
get to the point in the Assembly that when there is a humanitarian issue being 
considered, we go by consensus, which saves any of us from saying "no." I fear that 
when we talk about "new law" we may get a new law that nobody wants anyway 
and nobody is going to do anything about. I always have the feeling that, from the 
point of view of the impact on the public, a new law that we know nobody is going 
to do anything about just brings the whole law into complete disrepute. 
Dr. John H. McNeill, U.S. Department of Defense: There are many wonderful 
targets of opportunity here that could be engaged, but I would like to confine 
myself to a comment and to a question that have both arisen out of our discussion, 
particularly with respect to what Professor Bothe said about warring parties not 
having the right to cause damage to neutral territory. That in itself, I think, was 
engendered by remarks of Paul Szasz, who referred to a number of General 
Assembly resolutions and perhaps others calling upon the warring parties, the 
States that have participated in a conflict, to collect their own remnants, if I 
understood him correctly. 
I think there is something very important that is missing from that approach 
which is that there seems to be no recognition of the fact that in many conflicts 
today, and particularly in the recent Gulf War, there was an aggressor. I fail to see 
why States exercising the right of self-defense against an aggressor should be 
penalized for, in effect, protecting their own survival from what an aggressor has 
perpetrated upon them-they, being the innocent victim. I certainly hope that 
there is not a trend that we are going to see that treats everyone exercising the use 
of force, whether legally or illegally, the same when it comes to damages. I am not 
sure that the standard of damages should be that suggested by Professor Bothe, 
that warring parties should somehow be responsible for any and all damage to 
neutral territory. I know it has been suggested that even affects caused by ships at 
sea, having a conflict on the high seas, might have an affect on the biosphere and 
that they should be penalized financially for engaging in that act. 
Fortunately, I think that is still a ways off, although pending litigation may 
prove me wrong. I would like to focus on this, and I wanted to ask Professor Szasz, 
particularly, if Resolution 687-which specified that Iraq should be financially 
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liable for the damage it caused and which also sets up the U.N. Claims Commission 
to look at damages, including environmental damage and, basically, all damages 
that flow from aggressive acts-is not the correct way to look at the problem. 
Professor Szasz: In response to that point, I think Resolution 687 is correct. It 
says that, ultimately, Iraq will have to bear responsibility for the damage it caused. 
It does not quite answer the question of whether, since Iraq is not paying, 
somebody else who caused damage should also pay for the damage to a neutral. 
Now, of course, this military action was a bit different, this was a U.N.-sanctioned 
action and, therefore, one could say that the entire world community was lined up 
against Iraq. Those who simply acted as instrumentalities but caused damage, 
should not, therefore, themselves have to carry more responsibility. What I was 
saying before is that, as between two combatants and a neutral, if a neutral is 
damaged, there is no reason why even the combatant who is right should not 
initially reimburse the neutral even though the former might be able to recover 
ultimately from an aggressor. 
Let me make one more point with respect to Professor Bothe's suggestion. What 
I said was that not only do the rules of land targeting apply where the target is a 
neutral, but also where the target is the other combatant. The rules as to land 
targeting require combatants to follow the rules of Geneva Convention IV so as to 
protect civilians, rather than being bound by any "due regard" principles of naval 
warfare. So the prior suggestion mentioned, which I did not really contemplate, 
is the target State being the other combatant. 
Professor Roberts: In answer to Dr. McNeill, I am slightly worried about what 
he said concerning the significance of the war being against an aggressor, because 
it does still remain, as he well knows, that the basic rules of the law of war apply 
equally to all combatants during the course of the war. It may be that questions of 
reparations subsequently are a different matter. But in the course of the war, it is 
still the case that, for practically all purposes, the law has to apply equally to all 
belligerents. 
In response to Hans-Peter Gasser, I do not want to be depicted as saying, in 
connection with the protection of the environment, "forget Additional Protocol I 
and just stick to ancient rules." That is not my position. My position is that, yes, 
indeed, there is an important principle enunciated in Additional Protocol I in 
respect to protection of the environment. However, it does set a very difficult 
standard to meet. It is not a case of abandoning Additional Protocol!. It is a case 
oflooking, as well, at the provisions of earlier treaties; at other provisions within 
Additional Protocol I which cover, better than any previous treaty, the issue of 
accuracy in targeting; not destroying civilian objects, and so on and so forth. So 
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it seems to me that there are other provisions which are highly important. I cannot 
resist throwing that in at the end of the session when nobody can directly reply. 
In Britain, I think, we have interpreted the experience of the Gulf War as 
reflecting rather positively on Additional Protocol I, which contributed to the 
decision of the U.K. Government to ratify the Protocol. The ratification will 
actually be implemented imminently, but all the legislation is through. I know 
that there are many other issues in the United States concerning whether or not 
we want to ratify besides the issue of our experience in the Gulf War. Our 
interpretation of the experience, and I think some U.S. interpretation of the 
experience, is that Additional Protocol I does enunciate a number of very useful 
rules in clearer form than in other treaties and, therefore, is worth pursuit. 
Finally, I think we have had some tendency in the discussion to find what I 
would call "lawyerly solutions to para-political" problems. I do not believe that 
simply setting up another international fact finding commission or trying, by some 
new means, to have an international criminal tribunal look at the problems of cases 
such as the Gulf War, really addresses the fundamental problem which is that we 
live in a world of States. This same problem is arising in respect to the former 
Republic of Yugoslavia, where there are very difficult problems of determining 
whether or not one can effectively bring violators of the law of war to court. It is 
a problem that has preoccupied governments throughout this century and never 
more so than at present. I think that some times we have to admit that there may 
not be solutions to these problems and, certainly, there may not be "lawyerly" 
solutions to these problems in the form of tribunals or courts which are capable 
of really meeting the need that is undoubtedly there. 
Professor Walker: Two quick thoughts. The first is that some of the concern is 
about potential "liability of innocent States" in terms of punishing an aggressor. 
I can see a situation where a response may be totally disproportionate, although 
the position taken is whether there was "due regard." If calculated in 
proportionality, the due regard principle will take care of some of those problems. 
The second point is that we have to find out about the relationship of the 
environmental protection conventions such as the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention 
and regional conventions. I reiterate my paper's point that the other rules and 
principles take care of all that. Thank you. 
